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Abstract
There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously use a ‘must’-
claim like (1-a) and those in which one can use the corresponding claim without the
‘must’, as in (1-b):
(1) a. It must be raining out.
b. It is raining out.
It is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is difficult to account
for this difference, since assertions of pMust pq and assertions of p alone seem to have
the same basic goal: namely, communicating that p is true. In this paper I give a new
account of the conversational role of ‘must’. I begin by arguing that a ‘must’-claim is
felicitous only if there is a shared argument for the proposition it embeds. I then argue
that this generalization, which I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization
that ‘must’-claims are felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence for them is in some sense
indirect. Finally, I propose a pragmatic derivation of Support as a manner implicature.
1 Introduction
Consider the following sentences:
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(2) a. It must be raining out. von Fintel and Gillies 2010
b. It is raining out.
Intuitively, an assertion of (2-a) and an assertion of (2-b) have the same basic communicative
aim: namely, to communicate that it is raining out. Once an assertion of (2-a) has been accepted,
interlocutors are disposed to accept that it is raining out, as witnessed by the oddness of (3):
(3) ??It must be raining; and moreover, it is raining.
Thus (2-a) seems to be as strong as (2-b). But it does not seem to be stronger than (2-b): it is
very strange to assert (2-a) after (2-b) is already accepted, as witnessed by the oddness of (4):
(4) ??It’s raining; and moreover, it must be raining.
This suggests that assertions of (2-a) and (2-b) carry the same basic information. Yet the con-
ditions in which they can be felicitously asserted differ in subtle ways. Suppose that Jane is
in a windowless room, and sees her colleagues come in with wet umbrellas. Then she can
assert either (2-a) or (2-b). But now suppose that Jane is looking out a window at the rain.
She can still assert (2-b), but an assertion of (2-a)—‘It must be raining out’—would be decid-
edly odd. Generally speaking, there is a systematic difference between the conditions in which
one can felicitously assert a ‘must’-claim with complement p, versus the conditions in which
one can felicitously assert p alone.1 Accounting for these differences is a challenge known as
Karttunen’s Problem;2 the goal of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem.
The argument of the paper comes in three parts. I begin by trying to get clear on the data:
what the difference in felicity conditions between sentences like (2-a) and (2-b) amounts to.
The main claim in the literature, which I call Indirectness, is that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous
only if the speaker’s evidence for its prejacent is indirect, whereas its bare prejacent can be
asserted whether the speaker’s evidence is direct or indirect. I argue that, while Indirectness is,
suitably spelled out, correct, there is another, equally important, generalization which plays a
key role in solving Karttunen’s Problem: namely, that a ‘must’-claim is signficantly degraded
unless the speaker ensures there is a salient argument in support of the claim’s prejacent. I call
this constraint Support. Then I show that once we have Support clearly in sight, we can derive
Indirectness through general pragmatic reasoning. This reasoning reduces our judgments about
the indirectness of ‘must’ to judgments about when a sequence of assertions is redundant.
Finally, I give a Gricean account of why Support arises in the first place.
1A ‘must’-claim is a claim containing an unembedded and unrestricted strong epistemic necessity modal such as
‘must,’ ‘it can’t be’, etc., read epistemically. I use ‘must’ as an exemplar of such modals, but my claims here are
about strong epistemic necessity modals in general. I use ‘p’ as a sentence variable; ‘p’ denotes the proposition
expressed by p (suppressing implicit relativization to contexts for readability).
2Following von Fintel and Gillies (2010), who credit Karttunen (1972) with bringing the issue to attention.
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2 Data
I begin by trying to get clear on the difference in felicity conditions between assertions of
pMust pq and p.
2.1 Indirectness
The main claim in the literature is that the difference amounts to an indirectness constraint:3
Indirectness: Asserting pMust pq is felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence for p
is indirect.
By contrast, of course, a non-modal claim can be felicitous whether the speaker’s evidence is
direct or indirect. Indirectness is motivated with cases like (5) and (6):
(5) [Watching the rain:]
a. ??It must be raining.
b. It’s raining.
(6) [Seeing your colleagues enter with wet umbrellas:]
a. It must be raining.
b. It’s raining.
(5-a) is distinctly weird as compared with (5-b), (6-a), and (6-b). Indirectness is the most nat-
ural generalization to draw from data like these. Indirectness has been well-motivated in the
literature, and so I will assume without further discussion that some precisification of the prin-
ciple is correct. More, of course, needs to be said about what counts as “indirect” here, as well
as about the source of Indirectness, both questions which I return to below (see §3.4 in partic-
ular). For now, though, note that I do not assume that the concept of indirectness which plays
a role in Indirectness neatly matches pre-theoretic intuitions about whether evidence is direct
or not.4 For instance, reliable testimony is (according to some intuitions) indirect evidence;
but, as von Fintel and Gillies (2010) observe, we must treat it as “direct” when it comes to
evaluating Indirectness, in order to predict the contrast between (7-a) and (7-b):
3The insight goes back to Karttunen 1972. See von Fintel and Gillies 2010; also Veltman 1985; Kratzer 2012a;
Matthewson 2015; Ozturk and Papafragou 2015; Lassiter 2016; Sherman 2018. Giannakidou and Mari (2016);
Goodhue (2017) both argue that this empirical generalization is better explained in terms of partial knowledge,
rather than indirectness; but they both still, as far as I can tell, endorse the generalization when understood in a
sufficiently broad way, as intended here. As I emphasize in a moment, I am leaving the notion of indirectness
intentionally broad and vague here; in what follows, I will propose one particular way of cashing it out, a way
which, of course, not all these writers would necessarily endorse.
4Or categories which are encoded as grammatical markers of evidentiality in some languages; see e.g. Willett 1988;
Faller 2002; Aikhenvald 2004.
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(7) [Tom tells Susie that it is raining. Susie says to Mark:]
a. ??It must be raining.
b. It’s raining.
2.2 Support
Most of the literature on Karttunen’s Problem has focused exclusively on Indirectness. But
a different thread in the literature has pointed to a further contrast in felicity conditions: in
making a ‘must’-claim, the speaker must ensure that an argument for its prejacent is salient to
all the interlocutors. I call this claim Support:
Support: pMust pq is degraded unless there is an argument for p salient to the
interlocutors and endorsed by the speaker.
By contrast, pMust pq can be felicitous when an argument for p is given. And non-modal
claims, or modal claims with weaker epistemic modals (‘might’, ‘should’, etc.) can be felici-
tous with or without an argument.
The key insight in Support is due to Stone (1994). The claim, however, has not received
much discussion in the subsequent literature.5 And indeed, the data that motivate Support are
somewhat less clearcut than those that motivate Indirectness. This is not surprising: it can be
difficult to determine, in a given context, whether an argument has been made salient. This
requires evaluating discourses as a whole, and it requires considering whether an argument
has been introduced either by linguistic means or through (possibly tacit) shared background
knowledge or accommodation. In the remainder of this section, I will adduce a variety of data
to argue that Support is indeed required to account for the difference in felicity conditions
between pMust pq and p, as well as the difference in felicity conditions between pMust pq and
modal claims of other strengths.
I begin by considering a variety of cases which bring out the need for Support. Consider
first (8):
(8) [Patch the rabbit sometimes gets into the cardboard box where her hay is stored. On his
way out the door, Mark hears a snuffling from the box and thinks to himself, ‘Patch must
be in the hay box.’ When he gets to school, Bernhard asks him how Patch is doing.]
a. [Mark:] ?? She’s great. She must have gotten into the hay box this morning.
b. [Bernhard:] Cute!
Suppose the conversation ends here, and assume that Bernhard doesn’t know anything about
Patch’s set-up at Mark’s house, or in general anything which might help him figure out why
Mark thinks that Patch was in the box of hay. There is something distinctly odd about this
5It is taken up briefly in Murray 2014, Silk 2016, Swanson 2015, and Lassiter 2016.
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exchange. Intuitively, what Mark has said needs more elaboration; either Mark should have
proffered reasons to think that Patch was in the hay box, or Bernhard should have asked him
for reasons, perhaps by saying, ‘Why do you say that?’ Here is a more felicitous version of
Mark’s assertion in (8):
(9) She’s great. I heard a snuffling from the box of hay on my way out—she must have
gotten into the box.
Now suppose the conversation ends here. This exchange has none of the peculiarity of (8).
What does this show? First, note that a non-modal variant of (8) is perfectly fine:
(10) a. [As in (8), except Mark says:] She’s great. She got into the box of hay this morn-
ing.
b. [Bernhard:] Cute!
The non-modal variant on (9) is likewise fine. The infelicity of (8) thus seems to be due to
the use of ‘must’. But note that Mark’s evidence regarding Patch’s whereabouts is exactly
the same in (8) as in (9). Moreover, Indirectness is satisfied—Mark’s evidence about Patch’s
whereabouts is indirect—so Indirectness cannot explain the contrast between them. By con-
trast, Support predicts precisely the pattern we observe: namely, that (8) will be relatively
degraded—since no argument for the prejacent is made salient—while (9) and (10) will be
more acceptable.
Cases like this provide our first piece of evidence for Support. Before giving further cases,
I will say a bit more about what Support amounts to. First, what does an argument amount
to in this context? I will treat an argument for p as a set of propositions which the speaker is
commonly recognized to believe provides reason to believe p—either by deductively entailing
its conclusion; by inductively supporting the conclusion; or by showing how the conclusion
follows from what is already accepted.
Second, what does salience amount to? I won’t say much about this, but a few features
are worth noting. First, an argument need not itself be common ground, i.e. need not itself be
commonly accepted in the conversation, to count as salient.6 One can felicitously assert an
argument conjoined with a ‘must’-claim, even if the argument has not yet been (and never is)
accepted by all the speakers (if Bernhard doesn’t believe me that I heard a snuffling from the
box of hay, this does not render (9) infelicitous). The sense in which an argument Γ must be
salient is rather that it must be common ground that the speaker takes Γ to provide reason to
believe the prejacent of her ‘must’-claim, and that she is proposing to add Γ to the common
ground. I will refer to an argument with this status as ‘salient’, ‘shared’, or ‘publicly available’;
I have in mind this somewhat technical sense throughout.
An important point about salience is that an argument can be salient without being made
6See e.g. Stalnaker 1970, 2002, 2014.
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explicit, as in (11):
(11) [Bernhard and Mark are in the bunny’s room, and can both hear snuffling from the box
of hay. Mark:] Patch must be in the hay box.
Here, the premise that merits Mark’s conclusion—that Mark can hear snuffling from the box—
is salient, and the ‘must’-claim is acceptable.
Another noteworthy feature of the notion of salience in question is that the argument need
not be salient at the time of the assertion; it can be provided shortly after the assertion, as in
(12):
(12) a. [As in (8), but Mark says] Patch must have gotten into the box of hay.
b. [Bernhard:] Why do you say that?
c. [Mark:] I heard her snuffling around when I was leaving.
A final important fact about the salient argument in question is that it must be endorsed by
the speaker of the ‘must’-claim. To see this, compare the following:
(13) a. Patch must have gotten into the box of hay; John told me that he heard her snuf-
fling around in there.
b. ??Patch must have gotten into the box of hay; John told me that he heard her snuf-
fling around in there, though John often lies about things like that.
An argument which is salient but not endorsed, as in (13-b), clearly does not satisfy Support.
2.3 More cases
We find further confirmation of Support when we turn our attention to a broader range of
parallel cases. Consider (14), adapted from Murray 2014:
(14) [Sarah works in a windowless building. On her way to a meeting, she sees her coworker
Jim enter the building, carrying a wet umbrella. Sarah concludes from this that it’s
raining out. Sarah enters the meeting. Her colleague Thomas, who didn’t see Jim car-
rying a wet umbrella, asks, ‘What’s the weather like?’ Sarah responds:]
a. ??It must be raining out.
b. It’s raining out.
c. It must be raining out; I just saw Jim come in with a soaking wet umbrella.
d. It’s raining out; I just saw Jim come in with a soaking wet umbrella.
[Thomas replies: Oh, too bad. Ok, let’s talk about the agenda for this meeting.]
As Support predicts, (14-a)—the variant with ‘must’, but without an argument—is odd, while
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the other variants (‘must’ with an argument, and non-modal claims with or without an argu-
ment) are felicitous. We find a similar pattern in (15):
(15) [Jane is in her first year of college. She doesn’t have a clear sense of how she is
doing in school. She meets with her professors, who tell her she is doing well; she
thus concludes that she is doing okay. She goes in to meet with her adviser to talk
about course registration. Her adviser doesn’t know about the conversations she’s had
with her professors. Her adviser asks: ‘So, how are you doing in your classes?’ Jane
responds as follows:]
a. ??I must be doing okay!
b. I’m doing okay!
c. I must be doing okay: I’ve spoken to all my professors and they told me I’m doing
fine.
d. I’m doing okay: I’ve spoken to all my professors and they told me I’m doing fine.
[Her adviser replies: ‘Good, I’m happy to hear that. Ok, on to our business for today:
let’s discuss your registration for next term.’]
Again, as Support predicts, (15-a) is marked, while the other variants are fine.
The next example illustrates the contrast of ‘must’-claims without an argument not only to
‘must’-claims with an argument and non-modal claims with or without an argument, but also
to epistemic modal claims of other strengths (responses are labeled for ease of reference):
(16) [Two friends, Scott and Mark, are discussing summer plans. Scott asks Mark: ‘Do you
think you’d be free to go fishing in a few months, say in the first week of September?’
Mark responds:]
a. [-arg, +must] ?? Yeah, I must be off work that Monday. Where would you want
to go?
b. [+arg, +must] Yeah, that Monday is Labor Day, so I must be off work. Where
would you want to go?
c. [-arg, -modal] Yeah, I’m off work that Monday. Where would you want to go?
d. [+arg, -modal] Yeah, that Monday is Labor Day, so I’m off work. Where would
you want to go?
e. [-arg, +should] Yeah, I should be off work that Monday. Where would you want
to go?
f. [+arg, +should] Yeah, that Monday is Labor Day, so I should be off work. Where
would you want to go?
g. [-arg, +might] Yeah, I might be off work that Monday. Where would you want to
go?
h. [+arg, +might] Yeah, that Monday is Labor Day, so I might be off work. Where
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would you want to go?
i. [-arg, +probably] Yeah, I’m probably off work that Monday. Where would you
want to go?
j. [+arg, +probably] Yeah, that Monday is Labor Day, so I’m probably off work.
Where would you want to go?
Assuming that Mark doesn’t remember that the first Monday in September is Labor Day, the
‘must’-claim in (16-a) without further explanation is marked, whereas all the other variants—
‘must’ with an argument, as well as non-modal, ‘should’, ‘might’, and ‘probably’—are per-
fectly acceptable as is.
Two further examples illustrate an important point regarding Support: an argument can be
shared even if it is not spelled out explicitly, but instead is quietly accommodated. (17) is taken
from a radio show:
(17) Mozart wrote the Stadler quintet for his friend Anton Stadler, who must have been a
marvelous clarinetist.
The announcer does not give an explicit argument that Anton Stadler was a good clarinetist,
but it is easy to recover from context. Second, suppose my phone rings; I can say:
(18) This must be my brother; let me take this.
It is, again, easy for you to recover my reasons for saying this from the context (I must be
expecting a call from my brother). (Some subtlety is required here. In general, when someone
asserts pMust pq, you can always thereby gather from that some reason to believe p, namely,
that the speaker has proposed to update with p. So the contrasts we have seen suggest that
the argument needed to satisfy Support must be more substantive than just that the speaker
believes p. I return to this point in §4.2.)
Another piece of evidence for Support comes from naturalistic written examples. Lassiter
(2016) discusses a range of examples taken from genealogical discussion boards, noting that
‘Ancestry.com users frequently provide an explicit specification of the evidence used to arrive
at a must conclusion’. Here’s one example, taken from The Plymouth Colony Archive Project,
slightly altered to improve flow across the variants below:
(19) [+arg, +must] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623 (PCR
12: 4). However, he is not listed among those who were part of the cattle division of
1627—the year we are interested in here; he must have died before then.
A variant which omits the argument for the ‘must’-claim, as in (20-a), is felt to be missing
something, if nothing more is said on the subject. By contrast, a non-modal variant with or
without that material sounds fine, as do variants with ‘might’ and ‘likely’:
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(20) a. [-arg, +must] ?? Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he must have died before 1627, the year we are interested
in here.
b. [-arg, -modal] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he died before 1627, the year we are interested in here.
c. [+arg, -modal] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he is not listed among those who were part of the cattle
division of 1627—the year we are interested in here; he died before then.
d. [-arg, +may] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he may have died before 1627, the year we are interested
in here.
e. [+arg, +may] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he is not listed among those who were part of the cattle
division of 1627—the year we are interested in here; he may have died before
then.
f. [-arg, +likely] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he likely died before 1627, the year we are interested in
here.
g. [+arg, +likely] Goodman. . . is listed as one of those who received land in 1623
(PCR 12: 4). However, he is not listed among those who were part of the cattle
division of 1627—the year we are interested in here; he likely died before then.
Comparing ‘must’ with other words that might at first glance seem to work in a similar
way, like ‘apparently’, can help bring out the plausibility of Support. Consider (21), adapted
from a television spy drama:
(21) a. The suspect is fleeing south. We’ve sent agents ahead to Mattapan.
b. Why Mattapan?
(i) ??The Russians must have a safe-house there.
(ii) Apparently the Russians have a safe-house there.
(iii) The Russians have a safe house there.
(iv) The Russians might have a safe-house there.
(v) The Russians probably have a safe-house there.
If the conversation ends here, then (21-b-i) is peculiar in a way that the ‘apparently’, non-
modal, ‘might’, and ‘probably’ variants are not. ‘Apparently’ is of particular interest here,
since ‘apparently’, like ‘must’, is constrained by a form of Indirectness; but ‘apparently’, un-
like ‘must’, is acceptable here without an argument.7 This helps illustrate the separability of
7I assume that the indirectness constraint for ‘apparently’ is somehow lexically encoded. An anonymous referee
for this journal rightly points out that this might provide support for a divided strategy, on which Support and
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Indirectness from Support, a point I will return to.
Finally, I note that informal polling suggests the contrasts reported here seem to be robust
across strong epistemic necessity modals in English (see §4.1 for further discussion of ‘can’t’)
and other languages.8
2.4 Experimental results
The intuitions reported in the last section provide evidence for Support. Informal polling sug-
gests these intuitions are robust. In this section, I present the results of an experiment which
provides further support for these judgments.
301 participants were recruited from Amazon Turk (https://www.mturk.com/). All partic-
ipants were based in the United States. We excluded from the analysis anyone who was not
a native English speaker and anyone who completed the study in 30 seconds or less, leaving
us with 273 participants. The stimuli in the experiment comprised the scenario in (16) along
with the eight possible responses there, which, again, vary as to whether there was an argu-
ment or not (the argument condition) and as to whether a modal was used, and if so, which of
three options—‘must’, ‘might’, or ‘should’—was used (the modal condition). Each participant
received the scenario, plus one of the eight possible responses, and then was asked:
Please tell us how natural you think Mark’s response was on the scale below.
The participant responded to this prompt by dragging a marker on a continuous scale from 0 to
100, with ‘0’ labelled ‘completely unnatural’ and ‘100’ labelled ‘completely natural’.
Each participant saw four scenarios total, one from each modal condition, chosen at random
within that condition as to whether or not it included an argument. The order of the scenarios
was randomized. The scenario was designed so that all four modal conditions are reasonable
to use as a response to Scott’s question, and it was designed so that Mark’s follow-up (‘Where
would you want to go?’) makes clear that he is moving on from his answer to the question,
suggesting that further information regarding his work schedule will not be forthcoming.
Support predicts that participants will find the [-arg, +must] condition degraded as com-
pared with the seven other conditions ([+arg, +must], as well as all other modal conditions with
or without an argument). Participant responses, which are summarized in Figure 1, show pre-
cisely this effect: participants found the [-arg, +must] condition substantially degraded (around
Indirectness have independent sources (which may coincide, as in ‘must’, and may diverge, as for ‘apparently’).
But there is evidence that the status of the indirectness constraint for words like ‘apparently’ is different from
the status of the corresponding constraint for ‘must’. For instance, although reliable testimony does not count as
indirect for ‘must’, it seems to for ‘apparently’. Suppose John tells us that it’s hailing out. Then ‘Apparently it’s
hailing out’ is perfectly fine.
8Informants who confirm the predicted contrast in Bengali, French, German, Hindi, Japanese, Russian, Spanish,
Swiss German, and Turkish; more careful research needs to be done to more thoroughly explore the cross-linguistic
picture.
10
the mid-point on the scale of naturalness judgments), as compared with all the conditions
(which were around the three-quarter point on the scale of naturalness judgments).
Figure 1: Mean ratings by condition. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Analysis of participants’ naturalness ratings revealed a significant interaction between the
modal condition (‘must’ vs. ‘should’ vs. ‘might’ vs. non-modal) and the argument condition
(F (3, 809) = 11.2, p < 0.001). To investigate the cause of this interaction effect, we separately
analyzed participants’ ratings within each modal condition for the [+/-arg] conditions. Within
the [-arg] condition, as predicted, participants found Mark’s response with ‘must’ to be sub-
stantially degraded—around the mid-point on the scale of naturalness (Mean = 57.20, SD =
28.86)—by contrast to all the other modal conditions, which they judged around the three-
quarters mark on the scale of naturalness (t’s > −6.08, p’s < .001, d’s > 0.74). Things were
entirely otherwise in the [+arg] condition, however, where participants found Mark’s response
to be quite natural (around the three-quarters mark) in all modal conditions, including the
‘must’ condition. Specifically, participants found ‘must’ to be significantly more natural when
an argument was included (Mean = 74.55, SD = 23.51) as compared to ‘must’ without an ar-
gument (t(257.9) = −5.43, p < .001, d = 0.66). Participants found the other modal conditions
with an argument to be roughly equally good, again around the three-quarters mark; partici-
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pants did not significantly distinguish ‘must’ with an argument from ‘might’ with an argument
(t(267) = −0.51, p = .611, d = 0.06), though there was some preference for the ‘should’
and non-modal variants over the ‘must’ and ‘might’ variants (t’s > −3.97, p’s < .001, d’s >
0.48). In no condition other than ‘must’ was there a contrast between the [-arg] and [+arg]
conditions that was similar to the observed contrast in the ‘must’ condition; in the other modal
conditions there was some variation between the [+arg] and [-arg] condition, but this variation
was small compared with the corresponding variation in judgments in the ‘must’ condition (a
+16.99 change in mean naturalness ratings for [+arg, +must] as compared with [-arg, +must],
versus a -2.54 change for ‘might’, a +6.25 change for ‘should’, and a +8.75 change for non-
modal).
These experimental results confirm the prediction of Support. They show that—as the intu-
itions elicited throughout this section suggest—‘must’ is felt to be significantly degraded with-
out an argument. By contrast, non-modal claims, ‘should’ claims, and ‘might’ claims are all felt
to be relatively acceptable without an argument—around the three-quarters point on the scale of
naturalness, as opposed to a mid-point judgment for ‘must’. And, as expected, the ‘must’ vari-
ant significantly improved when an argument was added, to around the three-quarters point on
the scale of naturalness—roughly the same judgment as for non-modal, ‘might’, and ‘should’
claims, with or without an argument. Note that the results here are graded. Speakers do not
reject ‘must’ statements out of hand when there is no argument, even though they find them
to be substantially less good than ‘must’-claims with arguments, or other kinds of claims with
or without arguments. One possible explanation of this is that it is the effect of noise in the
experimental set-up. It may be, for instance, that, in responding to the stimuli, participants are
assuming that Scott is able to accommodate an argument for the relevant claim: as we have
seen, an argument can become salient to a speaker’s audience through implicit clues or back-
ground knowledge, something which is difficult to control for in the experimental set-up. But
it also may be that Support is indeed graded and in some cases relatively weak. I will not try
to decide between these options here, proceeding simply with the conclusion that Support is a
real signal which must be accommodated, one way or another, in our theory of ‘must’.
3 Explaining Indirectness via Support
I thus conclude that Indirectness and Support are both necessary to characterize the difference
in felicity conditions between a ‘must’-claim and non-modal claims, as well as weaker modal
claims.9 We now turn to the question of how to explain these data. There are three strategies
to consider. We could account for Indirectness and Support separately; we could account for
Support in terms of Indirectness, and give an independent account of Indirectness; or we could
account for Indirectness in terms of Support, and give an independent account of Support. In
the rest of the paper I will pursue the third strategy. In this section I will briefly argue against
9I will not try to settle the important further question of whether they are jointly sufficient.
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the first two strategies, and then show how we can naturally account for Indirectness in terms
of Support.
3.1 Negative remarks
Pro tanto considerations of theoretical parsimony tell against pursuing the first strategy (pro-
viding separate explanations for Indirectness and Support). What about the second strategy?
This strategy is prima facie attractive, since there are a number of extant attempts to give an
independent account of Indirectness; it is natural to try to recruit them to explain Support.
But there are two problems with this approach. Most significantly, there does not seem to
be any way to reduce Support to Indirectness. A natural first thought is that we can explain Sup-
port in terms of Indirectness by way of a general pragmatic constraint that requires a speaker
to share her evidence for a claim if that evidence is indirect. But there is no such pragmatic
constraint, as we saw in cases above where non-modal claims were felicitous in cases where
the speaker’s evidence was indirect but she did not share it. A natural second thought is that
Support reduces to a requirement to assure your interlocutors that Indirectness is satisfied. But
this approach is not plausible, for a few reasons. First, in most of the cases given above that
are felt to be infelicitous without an argument—Patch in her box, Sarah in her windowless
office building, the Russian safe-house—there no particular reason to worry that the speaker’s
evidence might not be indirect. Second, it is not generally true that whenever a formulation is
constrained by a form of Indirectness, the speaker must habitually share her evidence in order
to reassure her interlocutors that it satisfies the constraint in question. We have seen this in (21)
with ‘apparently’, which is governed by an Indirectness constraint, but which doesn’t require
a shared argument; likewise, weaker epistemic modals, like ‘might’, ‘probably’, and ‘should’,
are governed by an Indirectness constraint (as von Fintel and Gillies (2010) emphasize), but,
as we saw in (16) (and the corresponding experimental results), do not come with a Support
constraint. Likewise, Murray (2014) observes that grammatical evidential markers for indirect-
ness do not give rise to any obligation to share one’s evidence. And from a more theoretical
standpoint, it is hard to see why an Indirectness constraint would directly yield an obligation
to share one’s evidence. We are generally charitable in assuming that speakers are complying
with felicity conditions. For instance, if Indirectness were encoded as a presupposition, then,
on a standard approach to presuppositions, it will be required that it be common ground that the
speaker’s evidence for the prejacent is indirect. But in general interlocutors are often happy to
accommodate presuppositions (Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 2002). There are caveats to this: for in-
stance, interlocutors generally will not accommodate presuppositions which involve anaphoric
content (Kripke, 2009), address a question under discussion, or contain noteworthy informa-
tion (Stalnaker, 1974, 2002). But these caveats do not seem to apply in the present case. To
derive Support from Indirectness, we would need an explanation of why interlocutors are not
in general willing to accommodate that Indirectness is satisfied. The most important problem
with the second strategy, then, is that there does not appear to be a promising way to derive
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Support from Indirectness.
The second problem with the second strategy is that explaining Indirectness itself has
turned out to be quite tricky: both main extant explanations have drawbacks which I will
briefly survey here. I will not aim to argue decisively against those approaches, but rather
to say enough to suggest that, even if we could reduce Support to Indirectness, there would
remain open questions to address before we would have a satisfactory solution to Karttunen’s
Problem.
The first main approach to explaining Indirectness is pragmatic. On this approach, an as-
sertion of pMust pq proposes a weaker update than an assertion of p. By choosing the weaker
update, the speaker signals that her evidence for p is too weak to merit an assertion of p. Thus
we can conclude that the speaker’s evidence for p is indirect, since direct evidence would have
merited an assertion of p.10
This approach seems obviously correct for capturing the correlate to Indirectness for weaker
modals like ‘might’, ‘probably’, and epistemic ‘should’ and ‘ought’. Assertions involving one
of these (unembedded) modals are uncontroversially weaker than the corresponding non-modal
assertions, and thus this account provides a natural explanation of the corresponding indirect-
ness inference. Nor, in those cases, does a requirement for an argument arise, as we have
seen—so there is no question about how to extend this account of Indirectness to an account of
such a requirement. But it is not clear that this approach extends equally well to the indirect-
ness of ‘must’, because—as von Fintel and Gillies (2010, 2018) have forcefully argued—the
assumption that pMust pq is weaker than p is at odds with intuitions about a broad range of
data involving ‘must’. Those intuitions instead seem better captured by Pragmatic Strength:
Pragmatic Strength: An assertion of pMust pq makes a proposal which is just as
strong as an assertion of p.
I will follow Stalnaker 1978 in assuming that an assertion of p is a proposal to make the
common ground entail p; given that assumption, Pragmatic Strength says that an assertion
of pMust pq is as strong as an assertion of p in that both are proposals to make the common
ground entail p. In other words, Pragmatic Strength says that conversants do not leave open the
possibility that p is false after accepting pMust pq: to accept the latter is, inter alia, to accept
the former. To see the motivation for Pragmatic Strength, consider the contrasts in (22):
(22) [Detective A: ‘The gardener must be the murderer.’ Detective B, responding:]
a. I concur. Let’s arrest him.
b. ??I concur. Moreover, I’ve discovered that the gardener is the murderer!
c. ??I concur. Let’s bring him and the butler in to see if we can pin down which of
them actually is the murderer.
10The classic source of this approach is Karttunen 1972; Veltman 1985 and Kratzer 1977, 1981 give semantically
weak semantics for ‘must’ which provide a basis for pragmatically weak accounts.
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Pragmatic Strength explains the infelicity of (22-b) as a response to Detective A: if Pragmatic
Strength is true, then p adds nothing over and above pMust pq, accounting for the infelicity
of sequences of the form pMust p. Moreover pq. And, likewise, Pragmatic Strength explains
the infelicity of (22-c): once a group of interlocutors accepts pMust pq, then, if Pragmatic
Strength is right, they should no longer leave open the possibility that p is false. By contrast, the
infelicity of these sequences is hard to explain if Pragmatic Strength is false: if an update with
pMust pq leaves it open that p is false, then it seems like (22-b) and (22-c) should be perfectly
coherent. This point can be brought out clearly by contrasting (22-b) and (22-c) with variants
which use weaker modals which uncontroversially do not satisfy Pragmatic Strength, Suppose
that, instead of saying ‘must’, Detective A said ‘The gardener is [probably/most likely/almost
certainly] the murderer.’ Then the responses in (22-b) and (22-c) become perfectly felicitous.
This is, again, exactly what we would expect if Pragmatic Strength holds for ‘must’, since it
uncontroversially fails to hold for ‘probably’, ‘most likely’, ‘almost certainly’, and so on; and
the contrast would be puzzling if ‘must’ were pragmatically weak.11
Pragmatic Strength can also be motivated, following von Fintel and Gillies 2010, based
on the infelicity of conjunctions of pMust pq with conjuncts which propose to leave open the
possibility that p is false, as in (23):
(23) a. #The gardener must be the murderer, but there’s some chance that he isn’t.
b. #The gardener must be the murderer, but he might not be.
c. #The gardener must be the murderer, but let’s leave open the possibility that he’s
not.
d. #The gardener must be the murderer, but the butler is also a possibility.
e. #The gardener must be the murderer, but it’s possible he’s not.
f. #The gardener must be the murderer, but I don’t know whether he is.
g. #The gardener must be the murderer, but I don’t know that he is.
The infelicity of these variants is, again, explained straightforwardly by Pragmatic Strength. If
updating with pMust pq entails an update with p, then it will be incoherent to propose an update
with pMust pq together with a proposal to leave open that p is false, as in (23-a)–(23-e). And,
likewise, assuming that one should only propose an update with p if one knows p (as evidenced
by Moore’s paradox (Moore, 1942); see Williamson 2000 for recent discussion), Pragmatic
Strength accounts for the infelicity of (23-f)–(23-g). By contrast, it is hard to see how we
would explain the infelicity of the variants in (23) if ‘must’ is not pragmatically strong.12
11Indeed, it seems like for any n < 1, there is a clear contrast in this respect between pThere is an n% chance
that pq versus pMust pq. This seems like a particular problem for degree semantics (like Lassiter (2016)’s) which
predicts these to be Strawson-equivalent when n is sufficiently high.
12Lassiter (2016) adduces some naturalistic sequences of the form pMust p; possible not pq, and nearby variations,
which he argues are felicitous, contrary to my claim here. I find the data unconvincing, though I do not have
space to discuss them in detail here. I believe that, in each case, the intended parse is not of the form pMust p;
possibly not pq. The principle argument for this is that, in every case, ‘must’ can be eliminated without sacrificing
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All these considerations thus speak in favor of Pragmatic Strength, and at least suggest to
me that Pragmatic Strength should be the default hypothesis. The present approach to Indi-
rectness, which rejects Pragmatic Strength, incurs an as-yet unpaid debt: accounting for the
striking data in (22)–(23). If Pragmatic Strength is correct, however, then of course the present
derivation of Indirectness does not work.13
The main alternative explanation of Indirectness, due to von Fintel and Gillies (2010),14 ac-
cepts Pragmatic Strength, and posits that epistemic modals lexically encode that the speaker’s
evidence is indirect as a semantic presupposition. This approach is motivated by, and avoids,
the objection just given to the pragmatic approach. But this approach has its own drawbacks.
The most serious of these, pointed out by Ippolito (2017), is that this approach does not make
the right predictions about the projection of Indirectness from sentences which embed epis-
temic modals. I will not rehearse this point, which is somewhat complicated but strikes me as
quite serious, here.15 My present aim, again, is not to close the door on either of the extant
approaches to Indirectness, but rather to make the points, first, that both leave Support unex-
plained; and, second, that both have (perhaps serious) drawbacks; which together suggest that
an alternative approach is worth exploring.
3.2 From Support to Indirectness
In the rest of this section, I explore just such a strategy, arguing that we can derive Indirectness
from Support. In brief, the idea is as follows. First, Pragmatic Strength says that an assertion
coherence. If the intended reading were Lassiter’s, the results without ‘must’ would have the form pp and possibly
not pq, which are uncontroversially incoherent (see Wittgenstein 1953; Groenendijk et al. 1996; Gillies 2001;
Yalcin 2007). In any case, the comparison without ‘must’ suggests that these cases do not evidence a contrast in
strength between ‘must’-claims and non-modal claims. Lassiter also reports an experiment in which participants
are presented with a raffle scenario, and then asked to evaluate ‘Bill did not win the raffle’, ‘Bill must not have
won the raffle’, ‘It is possible that Bill won the raffle’, and so on. Participants agreed with these three claims 69%,
58%, and 92% of the time, respectively. As Lassiter notes, these results are consistent with pMust pq entailing
p (and thus with Pragmatic Strength), since participants were just as inclined to accept p as they were to accept
pMust pq.
13Pragmatic Strength is distinct from the strictly stronger principle that pMust pq entails that contextually relevant
agents know p (which Lassiter (2016); Giannakidou and Mari (2016) argue against), and from the strictly stronger
principle that pMust pq entails p (which Lassiter leaves open). Giannakidou and Mari (2016, 2017) defend an
obligatorily weak view, on which pMust pq is not only compatible with lack of knowledge of p, but in fact entails
that the speakers do not have “complete knowledge” of p. This, however, strike me as untenable. If this were
correct, then sequences of the form pMust p, and I know p for sureq, and nearby variants, should be infelicitous,
but they are not, as witnessed by the felicity of sequences like (24):
(24) John must be at home; I [am completely sure/am certain/know for sure] he’s there, because he’s bedrid-
den and cannot leave on his own.
Goodhue (2017) similarly argues that pMust pq is felicitous only if p is not known, which likewise seems to
predict that (24) will be infelicitous, contrary to fact. (In places Goodhue seems sympathetic to the idea that this
constraint is defeasible; the present point of course does not tell against that view.)
14And since (at least partly) endorsed and elaborated in Kratzer 2012a, Matthewson 2015, Lassiter 2016.
15See also Sherman 2018; Matthewson 2015 for further discussion of criticisms of the lexical approach.
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of pMust pq is a bid to update the common ground with p. Support says that it is a proposal
to do so on the basis of an argument Γ. General principles concerning redundancy entail that p
should not follow from Γ in a way that is mutually recognized to be obvious. Finally, speakers
are generally obligated to give their best argument for p if they’re giving an argument for p at
all. It follows that, in order for an assertion of pMust pq to be felicitous, p should not follow
in a mutually obvious way from the best argument a speaker of pMust pq has for p. In short,
an assertion of pMust pq is a proposal to accept p on the basis of a shared argument, and this
is the kind of proposal one should make only when that argument leaves some epistemic space
between its premises and conclusion.
The first step in our derivation is the assumption, defended in §3.1 above, that an assertion
of pMust pq is pragmatically strong, in the sense that it is, inter alia, a proposal to update the
common ground with p.
The second step is to note that in general, when a speaker gives an argument in support
of p with the intention of getting her interlocutors to accept p on the basis of that argument,
the argument in favor of p must be non-redundant in some sense. Compare the two variants in
each of (25) and (26):
(25) a. I put Patch in her box this morning, and no one has let her out. So she’s in her
box.
b. ??I see Patch in her box. So she’s in her box.
(26) a. I’ve just read a CNN report that says Clinton has amassed a majority of pledged
delegates and superdelegates. So Clinton will clinch the Democratic nomination!
b. ??I’ve just read a CNN report that says Clinton will clinch the Democratic nomina-
tion. So Clinton will clinch the Democratic nomination!
(25-b) strikes me as objectionable; there is something pedantic or redundant about it. Likewise
for (26-b), unless there is some salient doubt about the veracity of CNN. By contrast, (25-a)
and (26-a) are fine. The difference seems to be that in (25-a) and (26-a), there is enough space
left between the argument in the first sentence and its conclusion in the second that its conclu-
sion is not felt to be redundant. This intuition can be regimented as a norm against redundant
assertions, along the following lines:
Non-Redundancy: A proposal to update the common ground with p on the basis
of an argument Γ is infelicitous if p follows from Γ in a way that is mutually
recognized to be obvious.
In the next section I will further explore this principle. Note for the present, however, that Non-
Redundancy nicely captures the contrast between (25-a) and (25-b), given our intuitive (albeit
vague) notion of what it is for an inference to be mutually recognized to be obvious. The first
is acceptable, since there is some epistemic space between the premises—having put Patch in
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her box in the morning, together with no one else having let her out—and the conclusion—that
Patch is in the box (epistemic space filled by background assumptions about Patch’s ability to
get out on her own, etc.). The second is not, since it does follow in a mutually obvious way
from seeing Patch in her box that she is in her box. Similar considerations apply to the contrast
between (26-a) and (26-b).
Note that Non-Redundancy, of course, does not forbid post hoc justification for an assertion
with a redundant argument; it is perfectly fine to justify oneself, if challenged, with something
like ‘Because I saw it’. What Non-Redundancy forbids is making an initial bid to update the
common ground with p on the basis of an argument from which p follows in a mutually obvious
way. Nor does Non-Redundancy forbid asserting p when p follows from your own private
evidence in a mutually obvious way; see §3.3 for more discussion. Finally, note that Non-
Redundancy is defeasible, as I discuss further in §5.3.
The last step in our derivation says that a speaker must give the best argument for p that she
has, if she’s giving an argument for p at all. To see the plausibility of this constraint, consider
(27):
(27) [John was at the Red Sox game and knows on this basis who won. He also read about
the game in the Boston Globe.]
a. [Max:] Who won the game?
b. [John:] ?? The Red Sox, according to the Globe.
If John intends (27-b) to answer Max’s question, then there is something strange about it; we
expect John to give his strongest evidence for the claim that the Red Sox won. In general, speak-
ers are required to share the best piece of evidence they have for a claim, if they are sharing
evidence at all. This follows naturally from a broadly Gricean vantage point on conversational
dynamics: in (27-b), John is violating Grice’s Maxim of Quantity by failing to ‘make his con-
tribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)’ (Grice, 1989).
More precisely, the lesson of cases like this is a corollary of the Maxim of Quantity which I
call Strongest Evidence:16
Strongest Evidence: When a speaker gives an argument for a claim, she must pro-
vide the best piece of evidence she can.
We can now put these pieces together to derive Indirectness from Support. Support says
that an assertion of pMust pq is felicitous only if there is a shared argument for p. Pragmatic
Strength says that an assertion of pMust pq is a proposal to update the common ground with p.
16See Faller 2012 for more careful discussion of how this kind of reasoning would go. To spell out Strongest
Evidence in more detail, we need to be able to access a scale of evidential strength, according to which, say, direct
perceptual evidence counts as stronger than any kind of testimonial evidence—on this point see also Faller 2001.
Strongest Evidence is of course in tension with the aim of brevity, and ordinary conversational moves presumably
aim to strike a balance between these.
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It is natural to therefore assume that an assertion of pMust pq is thus a proposal to update the
common ground with p on the basis of a shared argument for p. According to Non-Redundancy,
p must not follow from that argument in a mutually obvious way. According to Strongest Ev-
idence, that argument must constitute the best evidence the speaker has for p. It follows that
in order for a speaker to be able to felicitously assert pMust pq, p cannot follow in a mutually
obvious way from the speaker’s best evidence for p. In other words, the speaker’s best evidence
for p must be indirect, in the sense of indirectness relevant to evaluating whether an argument
is felt to be redundant.
In sum: in asserting pMust pq, the speaker has to ensure there is a shared argument which
represents her best evidence for p, and yet is not so strong that it makes the ‘must’-claim sound
redundant. Thus p can’t follow in a mutually obvious way from her best evidence for p. No par-
allel constraint follows for non-modal claims—since Support requires only that ‘must’-claims
be supported by an argument—and thus Indirectness follows from Support, plus Pragmatic
Strength, Non-Redundancy, and Strongest Evidence.
3.3 Non-Redundancy
Before turning to the question of how to predict Support, I will say more about the conversa-
tional architecture that underlies Non-Redundancy (in this subsection), as well as the predic-
tions made by the present derivation of Indirectness (in the next subsection). More could be
said about each of the assumptions I made in the last section, but Non-Redundancy is the one
most in need of further explanation here, since a central upshot of my account is that the signal
of indirectness associated with ‘must’ reduces to judgments about redundancy. Saying more
about redundancy will help us evaluate the theoretical foundations and empirical ramifications
of this claim.
Non-Redundancy forbids updating the common ground with p on the basis of an argument
Γ when p follows from Γ in a way mutually recognized to be obvious. Non-Redundancy follows
from two further claims. The first is that a proposal to update the common ground with p on the
basis of an argument Γ is a proposal to update the common ground with Γ and then with p. The
second is that one should not propose a series of updates if, should they all be accepted, the
final update will be judged to be redundant. The first of these claims is fairly self-evident. The
second requires further exploration. It has its foundation in the more general idea that there is
something wrong with redundant assertions, along the following lines:
Common Ground Entailment: Don’t assert p if p is entailed by the common ground.17
This norm is very natural if we think of conversations as cooperative enterprises whose main
goal is information transfer. Asserting what is already common ground does not serve that goal.
17See Stalnaker 1974, 1978, 1973. Some version of this norm applies at the subsentential level as well; see e.g.
Schlenker 2008, 2009, Mayr and Romoli 2016.
19
Common Ground Entailment, however, is not quite right.18 It overgenerates, for instance,
in cases like (28) and (29):
(28) a. [A:] If it’s raining out, then Bob brought his umbrella. If Bob brought his um-
brella, then he won’t have noticed that we had the roof redone. And, it was raining
out.
b. [B:] Ok.
c. [A:] So Bob won’t have noticed that we had the roof redone.
(29) a. [A:] If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be
decidable.
b. [B:] Ok.
c. [A:] The halting problem is not decidable.
d. [B:] Right.
e. [A:] So the set of validities is not decidable.
Common Ground Entailment wrongly predicts that the last response in each of these sequences,
which is entailed by what comes before, will be infelicitous. But in both cases, the final re-
sponse is acceptable: it simply makes explicit the conclusion of a somewhat complex chain
of reasoning. The problem, evidently, is that entailment is the wrong notion to play the role it
does in Common Ground Entailment: sometimes assertions are not felt to be redundant even if
they are contextually entailed, provided this is not mutually obvious.
A natural move at this point would be to say that an assertion is redundant if it is entailed
by the common ground in a way mutually recognized to be obvious (in a derogatory sense: a
sense which makes an assertion superfluous). In the present case, we say that (28-c) is not a
mutually obvious entailment of (28-a), and thus we rightly predict its felicity; likewise, (29-e)
is not a mutually obvious entailment of (29-a) and (29-b). What counts as a mutually obvious
entailment will depend on the context, and will be a matter of ongoing negotiation, as I discuss
further below.19
Merely changing ‘entailed’ to ‘entailed in a mutually obvious way’ does not yet, how-
ever, yield a satisfying principle. The modified principle will undergenerate in important cases.
Consider (30):
(30) a. What time is the movie?
b. The cinema website says that it’s at 7:30.
18A different place where Common Ground Entailment goes wrong is in terms of side effects like making a discourse
referent available. See Barker and Taranto 2003; MacFarlane 2004; Barker 2009; Franke and de Jager 2007;
Bronnikov 2008; Kripke 2009; Wolf and Cohen 2011; Crone 2015. I will, however, ignore side effects here for
the sake of simplicity.
19As Justin Khoo has pointed out to me, this will help explain why it can be rude to spell things out in detail: this
shows that you are not treating something as mutually obvious which your interlocutor assumed was.
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c. Ok.
d. ??So the movie’s at 7:30.
(30-d) is, in most contexts, unacceptable—intuitively, because it is felt to be redundant. But
(30-b) does not entail (30-d). To capture data like these, we need to use a more permissive
relation than entailment: a relation which can capture the sense in which ‘the movie is at 7:30’
follows from ‘the cinema website says that the movie is at 7:30’.20 Here I will simply use
‘follows from’ to capture this relation, with the understanding that we get a feel for the notion
from examples like (30). If Γ entails p, then p follows from Γ; but p also might follow from Γ
if p is a reasonable default inference, or is highly probabilified by Γ. Much more needs to be
said here in order to have a rigorous theory, of course, but this suffices for our purpose.
The most natural way to capture these two revisions to Common Ground Entailment is to
model the common ground as a set of propositions which is closed under mutually obvious
inference—if p is in the common ground and q follows from p in a mutually obvious way, then
q is in the common ground—but which is not closed under logical entailment in general. Then
we can state our redundancy principle simply as follows:21
Common Ground Settlement: Don’t assert p if p is in the common ground.
Common Ground Settlement, then, provides a reasonable basis for Non-Redundancy. The latter,
in turn, follows from the former given the very natural assumption that one should not make
an assertion which would violate a conversational norm were it accepted. This is required to
account for cases like (25-b), where we cannot assume that ‘I see Patch in her box’ is actually
common ground before ‘So she’s in her box’ is processed—only that it is intended to be.
There is, again, much more to be said about Common Ground Settlement—about when
something follows from a set of premises, when it does so in a way mutually recognized to be
obvious, and what underlying theory of mind is required to account for this. But as we will see
now, even the first-pass account laid out here yields striking predictions about ‘must’.
3.4 Predictions
Our account reduces the sense of indirectness relevant to ‘must’-claims to the sense in which
an inference can count as mutually obvious. Although much more could be done to spell out
what mutually obvious inference amounts to, this does not mean that we have just reduced one
20A different response to data like this would be to hold that in cases like this, we accommodate an enthymematic
premise, so that this really is a contextual entailment. I do not see how to choose between this response and the
present one; either formulation would do for our purposes.
21Note that if we model the common ground this way, then—if we follow standard assumptions in treating it as
derivative from individual mental states (as in Stalnaker 2002)—the present considerations can be extended to
argue in favor of likewise modeling individual attitudes as sets of propositions with these closure properties. The
appropriate semantics for attitude reports would thus be a neighborhood semantics, rather than a standard modal
semantics (Montague 1970, Scott 1970). See Kratzer 2012b, pp. 19-20 for related discussion.
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obscure concept to another. For, while we don’t have a complete theory of redundancy, we do
have a rough operationalization of it: an inference from Γ to p is mutually obvious in a context
just in case proposing to accept p on the basis of Γ in that context is felt to be redundant,
otiose, pedantic, etc. This is obviously a bit vague, but the underlying notion is vague too,
and, as I will now discuss, this characterization suffices to predict a variety of data which are
either not predicted at all, or else are simply stipulated, on alternate accounts. In other words,
having spelled out Non-Redundancy more carefully, we are in a position to flesh out a striking
empirical prediction of our account: namely, that S’s evidence Γ for p counts as indirect in the
sense relevant to Indirectness just in case an assertion of p following sequential assertions of
the elements of Γ does not strike us as redundant.
I will highlight a few points in this respect. First, as noted above, von Fintel and Gillies
(2010) observe that reliable testimony generally counts as direct in the sense relevant to ‘must’:
(31) ??The website says the movie is at 7:30. So the movie must be at 7:30.
This follows immediately on our approach. This is because reliable testimony for p is typi-
cally felt to make a subsequent assertion of p redundant, as shown by examples like (30) (a
non-modal variant of (31)). Why sequences like this are treated as redundant is, of course, an
important further question for theories of redundancy to address; but, without yet having an
answer to this question, the present approach predicts this data point in a non-stipulative way.
The second prediction of our approach I will highlight is that what counts as redundant
in a given context—and thus judgments about the felicity of ‘must’—will be context-sensitive,
since Non-Redundancy is context-sensitive. In particular, what counts as redundant in a context
depends on what counts as mutually obvious in that context. Thus, e.g., while (31) is infelic-
itous out of the blue, it may be felicitous in a context in which the inference from website
listings to fact is not generally accepted, as in (32):
(32) Google says that the movie is at 7:30. Websites listing movie times are generally
extremely unreliable. Google is extremely reliable, though, so the movie is indeed at
7:30.
If Indirectness bottoms out in judgments about redundancy, we thus predict that what counts
as indirect will, likewise, be a context-sensitive matter. This prediction, again, is borne out.
While (31) was strange out of the blue, it is much improved in (33), which, like (32), calls into
question the reliability of websites listing movie times:
(33) Google says that the movie is at 7:30. Websites listing movie times are generally
extremely unreliable. Google is extremely reliable, though, so the movie must indeed
be at 7:30.
A similar example, adapted from von Fintel and Gillies 2010, provides a nice further illus-
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tration of this point. Suppose that we are at an epistemology conference, where the inference
from appearances to reality have been constantly called into question. In such a context, the in-
ference from ‘It appears to be raining’ to ‘It’s raining’ will not be treated as mutually obvious;
sequences with the form of (34), while perhaps still somewhat odd, will be much improved as
compared with ordinary contexts:
(34) It appears to be raining, so it is raining!
This leads us to predict that, in this context, our first example—using ‘must’ when we are
looking out at the rain—will be much improved. And this is just what we find: (35) and (36)
are much improved in this context, as compared with ordinary contexts.
(35) It appears to be raining, so it must indeed be raining!
(36) [Looking out at the rain] It must be raining!
Indirectness thus indeed seems to be context-sensitive in just the same way that Non-Redundancy
is, as we predict.
These cases show a kind of context-sensitivity in which something like a skeptical scenario
has been raised, making the inference from a given set of premises to a conclusion less secure
than it normally is. This may make it look like the sense of indirectness relevant for ‘must’
patterns with knowledge ascriptions, something that Giannakidou and Mari (2016); Goodhue
(2017) have indeed argued for. But as Goodhue points out, there are other forms of context-
sensitivity relevant to ‘must’ that do not seem to have anything to do with knowledge. Here is
one of Goodhue’s cases:
(37) [Billy is talking to her sister on the phone, and her sister has denied that it could be
raining and has demanded repeatedly that Billy explain how she knows for sure that it
is raining. At her wits’ end, Billy says:] If light enters your eyes in such a way that it
looks like rain, then it is raining. Light is entering my eyes in such a way that it looks
like rain. Therefore, it must be raining.
This is not a case of skeptical scenario raising—Billy’s sister’s obstinacy is not depriving Billy
of knowledge, she is just being obstinate. Yet the ‘must’ in (37) seems felicitous. So the context-
sensitivity of Indirectness does not, after all, pattern with the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’. In
this case, however, it does again pattern with the context-sensitivity of redundancy: by refusing
to accept ordinary inferential reasoning, Billy’s sister makes it clear that that reasoning is not
mutually obvious (since it’s not obvious to her), and thus a ‘must’ here is licensed. Cases like
this provide further support for the claim that the context-sensitivity of Indirectness patterns
with the context-sensitivity of mutual obviousness (not with the context-sensitivity of knowl-
edge ascriptions).
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A third point I will highlight here is that the present account lets us explain why ‘must’-
claims that conclude a complicated argument are generally acceptable, even if the premises of
the argument entail its conclusion. ‘Must’ is often warranted in deductive contexts—mathematical
or logical environments where explicit premises are given which entail the conclusion—like
(38).22
(38) If the set of validities were decidable, then the halting problem would be decidable.
The halting problem is not decidable. So the set of validities must be undecidable.
By contrast, in other deductive contexts, like (39), ‘must’ is not licensed:
(39) I have three students in my logic class, and four other students in my semantics class,
and those are my only classes. So I must have seven students total.
Our approach makes sense of this contrast in a straightforward way, since the conclusion of
(38) does not follow in a way that is mutually obvious from the premises (even if it is entailed
by them, and indeed by anything); whereas the conclusion of (39) does follow in a mutually
obvious way from the premises.23
A final set of predictions of the present account has to do with the structure of my deriva-
tion of Indirectness. I have proposed that Indirectness arises due to conversational norms. It is
22Giannakidou and Mari (2016); Goodhue (2017) have argued that this ‘must’ is not genuinely epistemic, but
instead is a “logical” or “deductive” ‘must’. It is hard to rule out an ambiguity thesis, but it is obviously inelegant
to multiply modal flavors further than we need to. More seriously, even if we say that the ‘must’ in cases like
these is not epistemic, we still need a theory of its distribution, since it is not always warranted, even when its
complement is a logical consequence of the relevant premises. That is, ‘must’ sounds fine in (38) and bad in
(39). So, if we distinguish deductive from epistemic ‘must’, we end up doubling Karttunen’s Problem: we must
then account for the distribution of ‘must’ in both epistemic and deductive contexts. Neither Giannikidou and
Mari nor Goodhue offers a solution to this problem; e.g. if we simply say, following Goodhue, that the deductive
‘must’ ‘quantifies universally over the possibilities compatible with the overtly uttered premisses’, then both (38)
and (39) should be equally felicitous. By contrast, my account provides a unified account of the distribution of
‘must’ in both deductive and non-deductive contexts. (A referee helpfully suggests that perhaps Giannikidou and
Mari and Goodhue have in mind a different characterization of ‘deductive’, on which (38) but not (39) counts
as a deductive environment. This may be; but then my point is simply that that characterization needs to be
given explicitly. Either way, the point is the same: we need a theory of when ‘must’ is warranted in (what I call)
deductive environments.) Goodhue adduces cross-linguistic data which he claims suggest that some languages
distinguish a deductive from an epistemic ‘must’, and more work is clearly needed here. It should be noted that
distinguishing a deductive from epistemic ‘must’ is of course consistent with my view.
23As noted above, the ability of our account to deal with these cases very much depends on being able to spell out
Non-Redundancy in a way that avoids the conclusion that every necesary truth follows in a mutually obvious way
from every other one. This conclusion is obviously false, but it is notoriously difficult to give a formal model of
this, and I do not attempt to do so here. As far as I can tell, the distribution of ‘must’ in logical and mathematical
environments is unexplained by von Fintel and Gillies 2010: since logical and mathematical truths are entailed
by anything, our evidence for them will, in von Fintel and Gillies’ terms, always count as “direct”, and thus
‘must’ should never be licensed. As Goodhue (2017) writes, ‘deduction contexts do not provide clear evidence in
favor of one account of epistemic modality over another since they are puzzling from the perspectives of both the
epistemic account and the indirectness account’. I think this is correct given extant accounts of Indirectness; by
contrast, the present account of Indirectness provides a straightforward and unified explanation of these cases.
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a hallmark of pragmatic phenomena like this that they can be cancelled, since the underlying
conversational norms are generally defeasible. We thus predict that Indirectness will be can-
celled when one of the underlying norms is not in play. This prediction, again, is borne out.
Consider first contexts in which Strongest Evidence is not in play because it is overridden by
considerations which prevent the speaker from sharing her strongest evidence for p. For in-
stance, suppose that Mary is at Tom’s party. She goes out to the street to smoke, where she runs
into Ben. She knows Ben wasn’t invited to the party, and doesn’t want him to know that she
was invited. Ben can hear music coming from Tom’s place, and asks Mary what’s going on at
Tom’s. Mary wants to communicate that he’s having a party, but she doesn’t want to share her
strongest evidence for this—and doesn’t seem to be under any obligation to do so, since she is
trying not to hurt Ben’s feelings. In this context, she can felicitously assert (40):
(40) Given the music, it must be some kind of party.
(40) may be misleading, but it strikes me as perfectly felicitous, despite the fact that Mary has
direct evidence that there is a party. This is precisely our prediction, since Strongest Evidence
seems to be suspended here.
It is somewhat harder to find similar cases in which Non-Redundancy is suspended, since
Non-Redundancy already has an element of context-sensitivity built in (since what counts as
mutually obvious in the relevant sense is context-dependent). But if we can find contexts in
which it is suspended, then we predict that in those contexts as well, Indirectness will be sus-
pended. One candidate context is the sort that we find when a speaker wishes to signal that her
interlocutor is being dense, and thus spells out reasoning even when it is mutually obvious:
(41) a. I can’t believe it. Are you really firing me?
b. Well, let’s see. I’m your boss. Under your contract, I have complete discretion to
terminate your employment at any time. I told you in writing that you’re fired.
So, yep, I’m firing you.
In contexts like this, the boss is spelling out reasoning that is mutually obvious; her assertion
seems to be felicitous, if obnoxious, and so Non-Redundancy seems to be suspended here. We
thus predict that Indirectness will be suspended as well—that is, that ‘must’ is perfectly felici-
tous here, even though the boss’s evidence about whether she is firing her employee is perfectly
direct. This seems to be borne out: (41) is also felicitous (if obnoxious) if we put a ‘must’ over
the final sentence. These points suggest that, as I have argued, Indirectness is indeed a prag-
matic inference, which will therefore be suspended when the underlying pragmatic principles
are suspended.
More generally, the present discussion shows that deriving Indirectness in the way I have
proposed not only gives us an account of where it comes from, but also gives us a predictive
account, one which allows us to make sense of the subtle pattern of judgments about the felicity
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of ‘must’-claims by reducing them to judgments about redundancy.
4 Support
Support plus independently motivated pragmatic principles thus provides a theoretically and
empirically satisfying explanation of Indirectness. I turn now to the question of how to account
for Support. I briefly survey and criticize the few extant proposals before sketching my own
proposal. (Just as my account of Indirectness in the last section was separable from my empir-
ical claims in §2, likewise my account of Support in this section is separable from my account
of Indirectness and empirical claims.)
4.1 Negative remarks
Support says that ‘must’ requires that an argument for its prejacent be made salient. A natural
first thought about how to account for Support is to treat ‘must’ as containing something like
an implicit indexical which refers to an argument: pMust pq means roughly pThis argument
entails pq, where the implicit ‘this’ requires a salient referent. Stone (1994) suggests an account
along just these lines: on his approach, ‘must’ has a lexical argument place which needs to be
saturated by an argument made salient by context.
A solution along these lines, natural though it is, does not work. The issue is that, as we saw
above, ‘might’ and ‘can’, unlike ‘must’, do not require a salient argument. We have already seen
a variety of intuitive and experimental evidence for this in §2; to recall the contrast, consider
(42):
(42) [Julie’s cat has been sneezing a lot. Ben asks her how the cat is doing. Julie says:]
a. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet actually, he might have an upper
respiratory infection.
b. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet actually, he has an upper respiratory
infection.
c. ??Not so great. I need to take him to the vet actually, he must have an upper respi-
ratory infection.
d. Not so great. I need to take him to the vet actually, he must have an upper respi-
ratory infection; he’s been sneezing a lot lately.
If the conversation ends here, then, as Support predicts, the ‘must’ variant in (42-c) is infelici-
tous as it stands, without an argument. By contrast, the ‘might’ variant in (42-a), like the non-
modal variant in (42-b), is acceptable without an argument. In short: ‘might’, unlike ‘must’,
does not require an argument for felicity.
If we take Stone’s approach, however, then, assuming that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are duals, we
would predict that ‘might’ has an anaphoric requirement for an argument, just as ‘must’ does:
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if ‘might’ means ‘not must not’, then the argument requirement of ‘must’ will project through
negation, and thus ‘might’ will require a salient argument, too.
We could avoid this by giving up the assumption that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are duals, and
stipulate that ‘might’ does not have a lexical argument place for an argument. But going this
way would lead to a serious new issue. Assuming we treat ‘cannot’ as ‘not (can)’, and that epis-
temic ‘can’ is equivalent to epistemic ‘might’, if we go this way, we will predict that ‘cannot’,
like ‘can’, does not have an anaphoric requirement for an argument any more than (unembed-
ded) ‘can’ does. But this is wrong: the same examples we used to motivate Support for ‘must’
above can be used to motivate it for unembedded ‘cannot’. Thus, for instance, consider (43):
(43) [Emma notices that her neighbor Phil hasn’t taken in his mail in some time, and con-
cludes that he is out of town. Another neighbor asks if Phil is around. Emma responds:]
a. ??No, he can’t be.
b. No, he’s not.
c. No, he can’t be: no one has taken his mail in for a week.
d. No, he’s not: no one has taken his mail in for a week.
Just as for ‘must’, and just as predicted by Support, if the exchange ends here, the ‘can’t’
variant without an argument in (43-a) is marked. As for ‘must’, then, ‘can’t’ requires that an
argument be made salient. If we treat ‘might’ and ‘can’ as lacking a lexical requirement for an
argument, then we will also predict that ‘can’t’ lacks a lexical requirement for an argument,
and thus we will fail to make sense of the fact that ‘can’t’ requires an argument.
One might at this point simply claim that ‘can’ and ‘might’, which I have so far assumed
are semantically identical, in fact differ in just the respect that ‘can’ has an argument place
for an argument, while ‘might’ does not. This claim looks plausible enough in English, since
‘can’ is rarely interpreted epistemically when it is not negated, and ‘might’ cannot be easily
negated; we could maintain that these differ precisely in the respect suggested. However, the
cross-linguistic picture suggests that this line will be hard to maintain. Many languages use the
same epistemic possibility modal in positive and negative contexts, like German (‘ko¨nnen’)
and French (‘se pouvoir’). In those languages, informants tell me (based on contrasts like those
given above) that we find the same alternation as in English: matrix possibility modals in
sentences like (44) and (45) do not require a salient argument, whereas negated possibility
modals (hence with a necessity meaning), as in (46) and (47), do require a salient argument

































































‘The murderer can’t be the gardener’.
To pursue the line under discussion beyond English, we would have to maintain that there are
two words ‘ko¨nnen’ in German, one which only appears in positive contexts and has no re-
quirement for a salient argument, and one which appears only in negative contexts and requires
a salient argument. Likewise for French, mutatis mutandis, and presumably for many other
languages. Such an approach is obviously unattractive.24
4.2 Support as a manner implicature
We can avoid these problems by deriving Support as a manner implicature. The derivation de-
pends on the assumption that the interpretation of unembedded epistemic modals goes by way
of the common evidence of the interlocutors. This is not a commitment about the semantic
value of epistemic modals (and thus about their interpretation when embedded), and so this
assumption is compatible with a variety of semantics for epistemic modals, in particular the
standard modal semantics of Kripke 1963; Hintikka 1962; Kratzer 1977, 1981.25 On those ap-
proaches, an unembedded assertion of pMust pq is interpreted as meaning pp is entailed by
the contextually relevant informationq. The present claim can then be interpreted as a precisi-
fication of these approaches: that is, as the claim that the contextually relevant information for
unembedded modal claims is typically determined by the common evidence of the group of in-
terlocutors. As Stalnaker 2014; Mandelkern 2017a, 2018 argue, this kind of approach provides
a way to make sense of the basic update effects of modal claims, in particular the way they
are used to coordinate on the structural properties of the common ground. In particular, this
approach predicts that an assertion of pMust pq is felt to be a proposal to make p entailed by
the common ground, since, if it is common ground that the common evidence entails p, then,
given plausible assumptions about the relation between evidence and belief, p itself will be
common ground. This approach thus validates Pragmatic Strength—an assertion of pMust pq,
24Similar criticisms extend to any kind of presuppositional account of Support, since presuppositions project
through negation; as well as the account suggested in Swanson 2015, who builds on Kratzer 1981 in adopting
a premise semantics for epistemic modals, with the added requirement that those premises be publicly available
(see Moss 2015 for a similar proposal). As far as I can tell, that approach faces the same dilemma.
25Setting aside the role of a normality ordering source in Kratzer’s semantics, the source of its characteristic weak-
ness.
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if accepted, has the effect of adding p to the common ground.26 Likewise, given mild assump-
tions about the connection between the common ground and common evidence, it will follow
that if a group accepts p (i.e. if the common ground entails p), then they also accept that the
common evidence entails p, and thus they also accept pMust pq.
The key feature of this approach for present purposes is that an assertion of pMust pq ends
up having the same update effect as an assertion of p alone: if a group accepts p, they accept
pMust pq; and if they accept pMust pq, they accept p. So pMust pq and p, on this account,
are informationally equivalent in the sense that any context which entails one entails the other.
Note, moreover, that p is structurally simpler than pMust pq.27 Since they have the same basic
update effect, they will therefore be in competition: if a speaker chooses a more complex way
to achieve the same basic effect, this choice will require some explanation. What could explain
this choice? In the present framework, although pMust pq and p are informationally equivalent,
they have different subject matters. p on its own is simply about whether p is true. pMust pq, by
contrast, is about whether p follows from the interlocutors’ common evidence.28 An assertion
of pMust pq is thus like an assertion of p in that it is a proposal to commonly accept p; but unlike
an assertion of p in that it is a proposal to accept p which goes by way of calling attention to
the interlocutors’ common evidence for p. Given that the speaker will always have a choice
between a more complex alternative which calls attention to common evidence in this way, and
a less complex alternative which does not, an assertion of pMust pq will be felt to be, not just a
proposal to accept p, but a proposal to accept p with special attention to the common evidence
for p.
What kind of evidence would be worth drawing attention to in this way? One possibility
is that the evidence is just that the speaker herself endorses p. But there is nothing noteworthy
about this kind of evidence: this kind of endorsement is in play whenever the speaker proposes
an update with p—including when she does so by asserting p alone—and thus, if this were the
only relevant common evidence, it would not explain why the speaker did not just assert p, the
structurally simpler alternative. Calling attention to the speakers’ evidence for p will thus make
sense only if the speaker wants her interlocutors to accept p based on substantive evidence for
p—evidence that goes beyond the speaker’s endorsement of p. And if the speaker wants her
interlocutors to accept p based on evidence like this, then she will, of course, need to ensure that
such evidence is available to them—either by providing it explicitly, or by otherwise ensuring
26Though it does not commit us to the stronger, and more controversial, hypotheses mentioned above (that pMust
pq entails p or entails knowledge or certainty of p). The former of these would follow, though, if we treat evidence
as a factive notion.
27There is controversy about how to spell out the notion of (relevant) relative structural complexity, but this claim
seems uncontroversial to me; it will follow e.g. on the account given in Katzir 2007, according to which alterna-
tives are calculated by the deletion or replacement of nodes at LF. Likewise pNot pq will be a relevant alternative
to pCan’t pq.
28There are a variety of ways of spelling out this intuition; a simple approach just says that the subject matter of an
assertion of p—the question raised by such an assertion—is simply the question {p, p}. See Lewis 1988; van Kup-
pevelt 1995; Ginzburg 1995a,b; Roberts 2012; Yablo 2014; Bledin and Rawlins 2016 and citations therein.
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that her interlocutors can recover it from the common ground.
Let me pause to note the importance of this last point. It may look like, to explain Support,
all we have to do is endorse something like the above hypothesis about ‘must’, on which pMust
pq says that the common evidence entails p. But this leaves unexplained why the evidence in
question must be substantive in the sense just sketched, since whenever a speaker proposes to
update the common ground with p—either by asserting pMust pq or by asserting p—she is cre-
ating common evidence that supports p by publicly endorsing p. pMust pq requires something
more than this: again, it requires that the speaker ensure that a substantive argument for p has
been made available. The conclusion that such an argument is required is only obtained when
we compare pMust pq with p. Once we regard these as being in competition, we can reason
that, by choosing the more complex variant, the speaker is drawing attention to substantive
common evidence for p.
Summarizing this reasoning:
• A hears B assert pMust pq.
• pMust pq has a structurally simpler and informationally equivalent alternative, namely
p.
• SoAwill ask whyB chose to assert pMust pq rather than p in order to propose an update
with p.
• The only relevant difference between the two is that pMust pq, and not p, calls attention
to the interlocutors’ common evidence for p.
• So A concludes that B finds this evidence noteworthy.
• If the interlocutors’ common evidence for p were just that B had proposed to update
with p, and thus endorses p, there would be nothing noteworthy about this common
evidence, since whenever a speaker proposes to update with p, she thereby indicates that
she endorses p.
• So A concludes that B intends to update with p on the basis of some shared evidence
that goes beyond the simple fact that B endorses p; in other words, on the basis of some
substantive shared evidence in support of p.
• Thus in order for B’s assertion of pMust pq to be felicitous, B must ensure that there is
a salient argument which she endorses as an argument for p.
Importantly, this approach to Support avoids the objection to existing views given above.
In particular, this approach predicts that all and only strong epistemic necessity modals will re-
quire support. The reason for this is that a key step in the reasoning above was the assumption
that pMust pq and p alone are in competition. That, in turn, follows because of the assumption
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that pMust pq and p are informationally equivalent. This assumption will be merited for all
strong epistemic necessity modals (in the case of pCan’t pq, the competition is of course with
pNot pq), but only for strong epistemic necessity modals: weaker epistemic modal claims un-
controversially have a weaker update effect than p alone. Thus, unlike existing approaches, we
rightly predict that strong epistemic necessity claims (pMust pq, pCan’t pq, and so on) require
an argument, while weaker epistemic modal claims (pMight pq, etc.), like non-modal claims,
do not.
Is Support ever cancelled in the way that, as we saw above, Indirectness can be? It is not
clear to me that it is. The pragmatic principle underlying the derivation is something like pIf
p and q are alternatives with the same basic update effect, use the structurally simpler one
unless you have a good reason not toq. It is not clear that this principle is ever suspended.29
On the other hand, a derivation of Support as a manner implicature predicts that a violation of
Support—failing to provide an argument with a ‘must’-claim—will be relatively innocuous:
it will lead to puzzlement about the speaker’s choice of pMust pq rather than p, but not to
total communicative breakdown. This prediction seems to be in line with intuition and the
experimental results reported above.
Let me close this section by highlighting a prediction of the present proposal: any con-
struction which has the features which played an essential role in the derivation is predicted to
give rise to a Support-like constraint. That is, any construction which has p as a structurally
simpler relevant alternative; which has the same basic update effect as an assertion of p; and
which highlights the speakers’ collective doxastic relation to p, is, ceteris paribus, predicted
to be degraded without a salient argument for its complement (and thus also to give rise to In-
directness, via the pragmatic reasoning discussed in the last section). Further research should
explore whether this prediction is borne out.30,31
5 Weakness
This concludes the core of my response to Karttunen’s Problem. Before concluding, I take
up two residual questions. First, in this section, I address how my account explains the felt
weakness of some ‘must’-claims, and some related further contrasts between ‘must’-claims
and non-modal claims.
29See Lauer 2013, Ch. 9 for a defense of the view that some implicatures are neither optional nor cancelable (what
he calls ‘Need a Reason’ implicatures).
30Superficial exploration suggests it is; thus for instance pOur evidence entails that pq, pLet’s agree that pq, and pIt
is clear that pq all seem to have these properties, and do indeed appear to be governed by corollaries of Support
and Indirectness. See Barker 2009 for related discussion; thanks to Kai von Fintel for discussion.
31See Degen et al. 2015 for a different manner-implicature based approach to explaining the behavior of ‘must’
which, like the present approach, relies on the assumption that pMust pq is a costly alternative to p whose use
must be somehow explained, but which focuses on Indirectness.
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5.1 Uncertain ‘must’
There is some sense in which ‘must’ can be felt to weaken a claim. For instance, as Lassiter
(2016) observes, agents are sometimes happy to assert sentences along the lines of pMust p,
but I don’t know p for sureq, as in Lassiter’s naturalistic examples (48) and (49):
(48) This is not non-stick. There must be others but I don’t know for sure.
(49) This is a very early, very correct Mustang that has been in a private collection for
a long time. . .The speedo[meter] shows 38,000 miles and it must be 138,000, but I
don’t know for sure.
Sentences like (48) and (49) sound somewhat marked, but they do seem preferable to the cor-
responding non-modal variants:
(50) ??This is not non-stick. There are others but I don’t know [that] for sure.
A related observation is due to Degen et al. (2016), who use a series of experiments to show
that participants tend to assert pMust pq more when the speaker has weaker evidence for p,
and to assert p more when she has stronger evidence for p. Likewise, listeners tend to infer that
speakers of pMust pq have weaker evidence for p than speakers of p alone.
How can we make sense of this sense that ‘must’ is weak, particularly in light of the data in
§3.1 which suggest that ‘must’ is pragmatically strong? One option, of course, would be to take
these data to show that, after all, ‘must’ is not pragmatically strong. But this would, of course,
leave unexplained the data that motivated Pragmatic Strength above. And it is not clear that the
data here are inconsistent with Pragmatic Strength. They would be if, for instance, the second
conjunct of (48) had to be interpreted as a proposal to leave it open that there are not other
non-stick pans. But (48) could instead be a proposal to update with the proposition that there
are other non-stick pans, and to record that the speaker’s evidence for this proposition is less
certain than it could be. Likewise for (49). Indeed, as Paul Portner (p.c.) notes, examples like
(48) and (49) have the sense of cases in which the speaker’s is setting aside her mental state as
being not all that relevant: it is natural to interpret them as claims in which the speaker proposes
some update (that there are other non-stick pans, that the Mustang has 138,000 miles on it),
while also acknowledging that the her evidence for the claim is less certain than it could be. So,
in light of these considerations and the data reviewed in §3.1, it seems more promising to me
to try to make sense of the intuition of the weakness of ‘must’ while holding onto Pragmatic
Strength.
And indeed, it seems to me that there are at least two ways in which we can do so in the
context of the account I have given. The first is based on the simple observation that, on my
account—as on others—‘must’ is appropriate only when the speaker’s evidence is indirect.
Indirect evidence is not always weaker than direct evidence (in logical contexts, it is not); but
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it often is, and this may go much of the way towards accounting for the intuition that ‘must’ is
often associated with weaker evidence.
The second is based on the observation that, on my account, in uttering pMust pq, a speaker
proposes that her interlocutors accept p, but she proposes that they do so on the basis of an
argument that is publicly available, not on the basis of trust that she has private evidence for
p. And asking one’s interlocutors to accept p on the basis of a shared argument, rather than
on the basis of one’s own epistemic authority, will plausibly be permissible when one’s own
epistemic standing towards p is something short of what would be required for an outright
assertion of p alone. This is because, when the speaker proposes accepting p on the basis of
a shared argument rather than her own epistemic authority, the whole group is provided the
evidence in question, and tasked with determining whether or not the evidence warrants the
conclusion of p—rather than simply being asked to accept the speaker’s authority. Taking this
tack may well be appropriate when the speaker thinks that her evidence warrants accepting p,
but is not entirely sure, and so wants the whole group to decide whether or not p is warranted on
the basis of that evidence. By sharing her evidence for p with the group, she allows the group to
decide whether that evidence warrants accepting p—bringing closer scrutiny, from the whole
group of deliberators, to the decision. Such a move will generally be warranted only when she
thinks the decision merits such scrutiny; in some cases (though, of course, not all), this will be
because the evidence in question provides her with something short of certain knowledge of p.
In those cases, sharing your evidence for p allows the group to keep track of the inferential path
that led them to accept p. This is especially useful to do when you think there is a chance you
will later discover that p is false, since belief revision is most efficient when you have kept track
of the inferential relations between your beliefs.32 In short, then, because on my account pMust
pq amounts to a proposal to accept p based on a shared argument, asserting pMust pq thus will
be compatible with having weaker evidence for p than is required for asserting p alone. This
helps explain Lassiter’s observation that pMust p and I don’t know p for sureq is improved as
compared with the non-modal variant.
Let me note that this reasoning assumes that there is some difference between knowledge
and certain knowledge. In order to account for the data I used to motivate Pragmatic Strength
in §3.1, we must maintain that you need to know p in order to assert pMust pq. And, as Lassiter
observes, there is a contrast between pMust p, but I don’t know p [for sure/with certainty]q,
which is perhaps marginally acceptable, versus pMust p, but I don’t know pq, which, as we have
seen, is totally unacceptable. This contrast suggests that there is indeed a difference between
certain knowledge and knowledge (though I won’t try to give an account of the difference here;
see Moss 2018, §5.9 for some discussion) . Further evidence for this comes from the felicity of
exchanges like (51):
(51) a. [A:] I know whether John is coming to the party.
32In other words, when you have a sophisticated system of epistemic entrenchment; see Hansson 2016 for an
overview of relevant literature.
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b. [B:] Ok, but do you know for sure?
c. [B:] Ok, but are you certain?
5.2 Obligatory ‘must’
This helps explain why pMust pq is sometimes associated with relatively weak evidence for
p: pMust pq requires sharing that evidence and requires that evidence to be indirect, both of
which moves, for different reasons, are often associated with weaker evidence for p.
But what we have said so far leaves unexplained a related issue: why is an assertion of p
alone sometimes unacceptable in a parallel context, even when the speaker’s evidence for p is
shared? The point is brought out clearly by the following case, adapted slightly from Ninan
2014:
(52) [A and B are friends with a couple, Carl and Diane. It is common knowledge for A
and B that A and B have been dating for a long time and are likely to get married at
some point in the future. Suppose that, prior to the following dialogue, B has not heard
any recent news concerning Carl and Diane’s relationship. Now consider:]
a. [A:] Carl proposed to Diane yesterday!
b. [B:] At last! She must have said ‘yes’.
c. [B:] ?At last! She said ‘yes’.
(52-c) is somewhat marked in comparison with (52-b): it looks like we have a preference for
using the ‘must’ variant here. Intuitively, this is because ‘She must have said ‘yes” makes clear
that B’s conclusion is drawn from the evidence in common, whereas ‘She said ‘yes” makes it
unclear on what basis B drew her conclusion.
We have already seen that ‘must’-claims draw attention to commonly available evidence
for the prejacent in question, and so we have a good story about why the ‘must’ variant in
(52-b) sounds acceptable in this case. On our account, using ‘must’ makes B’s inferential path
explicit: by using the ‘must’ variant, B is proposing to accept that Diane said ‘yes’ based on
the evidence the speakers have in common about the strength of Carl and Diane’s relationship.
And B’s evidence in this case is weak enough that she has every reason to think that, although
she and her interlocutors now have reason to accept that Diane said ‘yes’, they may later have
reason to revise this commitment, and so it is crucial that they keep track of the inferential path
that led to this acceptance.
But why does the non-modal variant sound marked here? The reason is that using the non-
modal variant leaves it open that the speaker has evidence that Diane said ‘yes’ which goes
beyond what is shared in the context, and that it is based on this evidence, rather than their
shared evidence, that B is proposing to update with the claim that Diane said ‘yes’. In other
words, even though A and B do have shared evidence here in support of this claim, only ‘must’
makes it clear that the update is based on that shared evidence.
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To illustrate the point, suppose that A and B discover that Carl and Diane have recently been
fighting a lot. Should A revise her belief that Diane said ‘yes’? Intuitively, she should. And if
B uses the ‘must’ variant, then A will know that she should, since she will know the basis
of B’s conclusion that Diane said ‘yes’—she will know that B was just making an inferential
leap from their shared evidence. But not so if B uses the non-modal variant without further
elaboration, in which case A will not know on what basis B concluded that Diane said ‘yes’,
and thus will not know whether revision is merited. (Things will be otherwise, of course, if B
makes her reasoning explicit, even with the non-modal variant; and, as predicted, in that case
the non-modal claim is substantially improved, as in: ‘At last! She said ‘yes’, I can’t imagine
her turning him down.’)
In short: in this case, given our account of ‘must’, (52-b) amounts to a proposal to accept
that Diane said ‘yes’ on the basis of the evidence which is already shared; whereas (52-c)
amounts to a proposal to accept that Diane said ‘yes’ on the basis of the speaker’s epistemic
authority alone. In this case, taking the latter option obscures the inferential path which lead to
B’s conclusion—an inferential path which may well be crucial for A to have access to, given
the defeasibility of B’s inference that Diane said ‘yes’.33
5.3 Violations of Non-Redundancy
A referee for this journal points out that there are cases that are something like the converse of
Ninan’s case: cases in which a non-modal claim seems to be felicitous, but the corresponding
‘must’-claim is, at least prima facie, infelicitous. To see the point, suppose first that A and B
are looking out at the rain, and it is common ground that both can see that it is raining. Then it
may be acceptable for A to say:
(53) It’s raining.
This on its own is prima facie surprising for our account. If Common Ground Settlement is
right, then the common ground already entails that it is raining, and so A should not be able
to say this. But it was of course already recognized by Stalnaker 1974 that constraints on
redundant assertions are defeasible: they may be suspended when the purpose of an assertion
is not to communicate an increment of information, but rather to make idle conversation, set the
topic for a conversation, raise a certain matter to salience, and so on. Thus we could imagine
A saying (53) as a way of setting up the question of whether the picnic will be cancelled:
(54) It’s raining. Do you think the picnic will be canceled?
33This explanation may extend to another class of cases, brought to my attention by Agnes Callard, involving
moral judgments. ‘Lee was late, and therefore disrespectful’ is felicitous, but ‘Lee was late, and therefore must
be disrespectful’ is strange. The explanation, again, may be that we expect speakers to put the full weight of their
epistemic authority behind assertions like this.
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There is a contrast here, however, with the corresponding ‘must’-variant, which is quite odd:
(55) It must be raining. Do you think the picnic will be canceled?
The considerations adduced above to account for Ninan’s case can also help account for this
contrast. On our account, again, pMust pq draws attention to the interlocutors’ shared evidence
for p. If A is using p just as a conversation starter—to set the topic for the conversation, raise p
to salience, etc.—there will be no reason to use a variant which focuses particular attention on
the interlocutors’ shared evidence for p, and so using pMust pq over p will strike us as strange:
the use of a more complex variant to communicate the same basic information calls for an
explanation, and, when we do not have any reason to draw attention to our evidence in support
of p, such an explanation will be lacking. In other words, (55) is strange for the same reason
that (56) is in this context:
(56) Based on our visual perception, it’s raining. Do you think the picnic will be canceled?
This account yields a striking prediction: in a variant of the case just given in which the in-
terlocutors do wish to call attention to their evidence, the ‘must’-variant should be acceptable,
and indeed preferred. This prediction seems to be borne out. Consider the following variant on
von Fintel and Gillies (2010)’s epistemologist case (34). Suppose that A and B are epistemol-
ogists. Both accept that visual evidence can directly supply knowledge. So both accept that,
from the visual perception that it is raining, they can immediately conclude that it is raining:
this conclusion is mutually obvious to them. Nonetheless, A wants to start a conversation about
the precise nature of this inference. Suppose further that A and B are standing at the window,
looking out at the rain. A can say:
(57) It must be raining. In other words, our visual perception shows us that it is raining, and
that suffices for us to know that it’s raining. But how exactly does our visual perception
license this inference?
By contrast, the non-modal variant here is at least somewhat dispreferred. Suppose A said
instead:
(58) ?It’s raining. In other words, our visual perception shows us that it is raining, and that
suffices for us to know that it’s raining. But how exactly does our visual perception
license this inference?
In this non-modal variant, ‘in other words’ seems like a non-sequitur. (This judgment is a bit
subtle—after all, ’it’s raining’ could also be used to set the topic of rain-evidence. But the
’must’ certainly seems preferred here.)
Note that this case is subtly different from (34). There, the inference from visual perception
to knowledge is being called into question. In the present case, this inference is not in doubt;
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it is simply the subject of discussion. So this is not a case in which this inference ceases to be
mutually obvious, as in the case of (34); instead, this is a case in which this inference remains
mutually obvious, but is the subject of discussion, and so a ‘must’ is merited.
In sum, then, both ‘must’-claims and non-modal claims can be used when there is a shared
argument from which p follows in a mutually obvious way. In such cases, Non-Redundancy/
Common Ground Settlement can be suspended if there is a clear purposes served in doing so. If
the assertion is being used to set p as the topic of conversation, draw attention to p, etc., then the
‘must’-variant is clearly dispreferred; by contrast, if the assertion is being used (at least in part)
to call attention to the interlocutors’ evidence for p, then the ‘must’-variant is preferred. This
contrast is predicted by our account, on which pMust pq and p are in general in competition
with each other, and speakers use the former only if they wish to update with p while drawing
attention to their evidence for p.
6 Embeddings
The final question I address concerns how to extend the present solution to Karttunen’s Problem
to embeddings of ‘must’. First, note that Indirectness persists when ‘must’-claims are embed-
ded under connectives as in (59-a) and (59-b), which communicate that the speaker’s evidence
that Mark came to the party is suitably indirect:
(59) [Who came to the party?]
a. John did, and Mark must have as well; they’re inseparable.
b. John did, and Mark must have as well.
c. John did and Mark did.
Support also seems to be in play in cases like this. It is satisfied in (59-a), which is felicitous
as it stands. (59-b) is felicitous only if we can accommodate an argument that Mark came (for
instance, that John and Mark always go out together). By contrast, (59-c) requires no such
inference: there need be no salient argument that Mark came to the party.
A natural first response to cases like this is that, since these signals persist through embed-
dings, they must be semantically encoded. But this would be too quick. On the one hand, it
is not at all clear how to capture these data semantically. As Ippolito (2017) shows, encoding
Indirectness as a semantic presupposition runs into serious difficulty; as I discussed in §4.1,
the same goes for Support.34 On the other hand, I am hopeful that we can explain these cases
pragmatically by generalizing the strategy from the unembedded cases. The details of this go
34Encoding either of them as conventional implicatures would not do any better, since it would predict uncondi-
tional projection, and thus face the same counterexamples that make trouble for the presuppositional approaches
discussed above, at least on the approach due to Potts 2005, though others have resisted the claim that conven-
tional implicatures project unconditionally (e.g. Martin 2016). And it is clear that they are not part of the main
content of ‘must’, since e.g. pNot must pq clearly does not mean the same thing as pMy evidence for p is direct,
or fails to entail pq.
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beyond the scope of this paper, but the basic idea is that the principles that played a crucial
role in our derivation, in particular Non-Redundancy, hold not only at the level of sentences,
but also at a local, sub-sentential level.35 We can then reason roughly as above to derive both
Support and Indirectness; likewise for other connectives.36
‘Must’ under attitudes, as in (60), has a slightly different empirical and theoretical profile:
(60) James thinks Bob must be in his office.
Here, again, the ‘must’ seems to suggest that James’ evidence is indirect, but no correlate
of Support seems to apply here. How to predict this will depend on the interaction between
attitude verbs and ‘must’. The most natural way to treat epistemic modals under attitudes (as in
Stephenson 2007b,a) is to take the agent of the attitude predicate to “anchor” the modal base,
so that ‘must’ is interpreted as quantifying over the set of worlds compatible with a relevant
body of the agent’s evidence. Thus an attitude ascription like (60) says something like: James
believes his evidence entails that Bob is in his office.37 It seems to me that there is a natural
step from these truth conditions to the conclusion that James’s evidence is indirect—it is only
in that case that he would bother to reflect on it at all—though I will not try to spell this out in
detail here.
Much more needs to be said on the present topic, then; but this discussion should suffice to
give a sense of how the present account can be extended to make sense of the distribution, not
only of unembedded ‘must’-claims, but also fo embedded ‘must’.
7 Conclusion
The argument of this paper came in three stages. I began by arguing that, in addition to Indi-
rectness, we need Support to fully characterize the differences in felicity conditions between
an assertion of pMust pq and an assertion of p alone (as well as the difference between pMust
pq and epistemic modal claims of other strengths). Next, I argued that we can account for In-
directness by deriving it pragmatically from Support. Finally, I argued that we should account
for Support as a manner implicature.
The three main parts of this argument are, to a degree, independent: the second and third
part depend on the first, but not vice versa; and the second and third part are independent of
each other. If each of these moves is successful, however, then taken together, they constitute
a solution to Karttunen’s Problem: characterizing and explaining the differences in felicity
35Such a theory is needed to explain the infelicity of sentences like ‘If John is in Paris, then John is in Paris and
he’s having fun’. See e.g. Schlenker 2009, Katzir and Singh 2013, Mayr and Romoli 2016.
36Though importantly this approach will not predict that ‘must’ under negation requires an argument, since pNot
must pq and pNot pq do not have the same basic update effect, which was an important assumption in our
derivation
37Things are a bit more complicated than this, for reasons Yalcin 2007 points out, but need not concern us at present.
See discussion in Mandelkern 2019.
38
conditions between an assertion of pMust pq and an assertion of p alone. In short: because
of its more complex form and its difference in subject matter from p alone, an assertion of
pMust pq, unlike an assertion of p alone, requires that an argument be given for p. From this
requirement, in turn, we can conclude that the speaker’s evidence for p is indirect (in a relevant
sense), on the basis of general considerations about the flow of information in conversation. I
have argued that this approach provides an explanatorily and empirically satisfying account of
Support; of the subtle pattern of judgments underlying Indirectness; and, finally, of the sense
in which ‘must’ is felt to be weak, in spite of its pragmatic strength.
I close with an abstract point about the architecture of semantic and pragmatic theories.
My proposal rests on the assumption that an assertion of pMust pq and an assertion of p have
the same basic update effect, but different semantic values. Indeed, on the semantics I have
sketched, pMust pq and p informationally entail one another—in the sense that a context which
entails one entails the other—but they do not semantically entail one another. The possibility
of this divergence between update effect and meaning proved essential for capturing the subtle
divergence in felicity conditions between pMust pq and p alone; and so, if we are to adopt an
approach like this, then we must distinguish semantic content from pragmatic update effect in
theorizing about natural language.
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